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The Animal Welfare Act and USDA:
Time for an Overhaul
VALERIE STANLEY*
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is
charged, as many of you know, with implementing the
Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The AWA is the only federal law
that protects animals used in research, exhibitions and sold
by animal dealers. The AWA covers animals displayed by
zoos, circuses, carnivals, animal acts and educational exhib-
its.2
I will divide my talk into four topics. I will begin by dis-
cussing why we need the AWA. Then I will address why the
USDA has not been able to protect animals used in exhibi-
tion. Third, I will mention some regulatory or administrative
changes that the USDA can make to better protect these ani-
mals. I will conclude by discussing problems that are specific
to primates used in exhibitions and research experiments as
well as a case pending in federal court on this subject.
The Animal Welfare Act
The AWA, by regulation, excludes livestock shows, state
and county fairs, rodeos, pure bred dog and cat shows, fairs,
and exhibits intended to advance agricultural arts.3 It gov-
* Valerie Stanley, Esq., has worked in Animal Protection Law for twelve
years. Ms. Stanley co-founded the Washington based firm of Galvin, Stanley
and Hazard, which specializes in Animal Protection Law. She has been work-
ing as a staff attorney for the Animal Legal Defense Fund since 1993 and is
responsible for drafting rule-making petitions to federal agencies as well as de-
veloping, briefing and arguing national impact litigation, primarily against
state and federal agencies involving statutes enacted to protect animals.
1. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2131 (1970).
2. See id.
3. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2132(h) (1970).
The term exhibitor means any person (public or private) exhibiting
any animals which were purchased in commerce or the intended
1
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erns exhibited animals in three ways: (a) while they are on or
held for exhibition; (b) while they are being transported for
exhibition; and (c) while they are being sold among exhibitors
and other entities regulated by the AWA. 4 The AWA and
USDA enforcement therefore have been criticized by many
opponents.5 If we did not have the AWA, however, there
would be absolutely nothing to protect the animals from the
fast paced business world that uses their bodies in every way
imaginable, for every possible purpose. The Act is the only
protection these animals have. We need to strengthen the
Act and make sure that the USDA does its job.
So what are the problems with the USDA and the AWA?
As currently interpreted by the USDA, the AWA may as well
be called the "Animal Users' Welfare Act." USDA has forgot-
ten that the AWA is a remedial statute that is meant to im-
prove conditions for animals used in exhibition and research
and sold for these and other purposes. The Supreme Court
has ruled that when you have a remedial statute, you have to
interpret it broadly, so as to effectuate its purposes. 6 Unfor-
tunately, USDA's approach is one of not wanting to interfere
with business as usual. USDA has forgotten that its constit-
uency is the animals used in exhibition and research. Why is
that? I believe the heart of the problem is that USDA has
distribution of which affects commerce or will affect commerce, to
the public for compensation as determined by the Secretary, and
such term includes carnivals, circuses and zoos exhibiting such ani-
mals whether operated for profit or not, but such term excludes
retail pet stores, organizations sponsoring and all persons partici-
pating in State and County Fairs, livestock shows, rodeos, purebred
dog and cat shows and any other fairs or exhibitions intended to
advance agriculture arts and sciences, as may be determined by the
Secretary.
Id.
4. See id.
5. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAw, 185-233
(1995).
6. Rodriquez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U.S. 596, 614 n. 33 (1981). See
also Strann v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 782 (1983). "In addition, a remedial stat-
ute ordinarily is construed generously to further its primary purpose, even if
doing so requires interpreting terms broader than their common law meanings
allow." Id. (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst
Publications, 332 U.S. 111, 122 (1944)).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/11
ANIMAL RIGHTS CONFERENCE
been under tremendous pressure from another agency to ig-
nore its true constituency.
OMB Oversight of USDA
That agency is the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). OMB controls almost everything that USDA, as well
as every other Agency, does.7 Even USDA's correspondence
in response to Congressional inquiries must first go through
the OMB.8 Therefore, instead of complaining only to USDA
about its administration of the AWA, we also need to send our
complaints to the OMB.
Let me tell you how the OMB works. First of all, it has
traditionally been a conduit for industry. Any industry that
does not want regulations, that does not want a change in the
status quo, runs to the OMB. For each agency, including
USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), which oversees administration of the AWA, there
are point people in OMB. They oversee everything the USDA
does under the AWA.9 Their job is not to protect animals.
Their business is to know how USDA's actions are going to
affect the industries USDA regulates, how the actions affect
industry's bottom line, and how they are going to affect dol-
lars and cents. Their job is not to care about animal welfare;
their job is to protect business. Despite OMB's involvement,
the USDA itself has recognized that cost considerations
7. As former Deputy Administrator of Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs (OIRA) has noted, "The Government works using three things:
money, people, and regulations; the agency must get all three from the OMB."
See Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervi-
sion of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order
12,291, 4 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 1,6 (1984)(quoting J. Tozzi, former OIRA
Deputy Administrator).
8. See OMB Circ. A-19 (1979); Legislative Coordination and Clearance.
9. See Federal Yellow Book, p. 1-17-26 (1998); see generally Olsen, The
Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environ-
mental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J.
NAT. REsouRcEs L. 1,6 (1984).
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might not be compatible with the Act's goal of a socially ac-
ceptable level of animal welfare. 10
Various Executive Orders have required agencies to sub-
mit all proposed regulatory actions to OMB for approval.
Before 1993, Executive Orders 12,29111 and 12,49812 re-
quired federal agencies to go to the OMB first. Currently, Ex-
ecutive Order 12,866 requires this. 13 For example, when the
USDA wanted to propose regulations to improve the handling
of animals used for exhibition, the regulations had to go
through the OMB first.' 4 The OMB's reaction was that a pro-
posed regulation was too drastic a step and that USDA
needed to gather information on how to handle animals.
Of course, one of the time tested ways to kill legislation
or regulations is to study the subject. That is exactly what
the OMB has accomplished by having USDA change what it
wanted to do - propose regulations - to making a mere re-
quest for information. USDA has merely asked for informa-
tion, and the agency is still studying the issue today. The
Request for Information in the Federal Register focuses more
on subduing exotic animals and enshrining customary cur-
rent handling standards for exotic animals instead of seeking
information on whether there is an underlying problem with
the way animals in zoos and circuses are handled which, in
turn, causes them to go on rampages, and present other han-
dling "problems."' 5
10. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
11. See Final Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of
APHIS Animal Welfare Regulations, Part 3, standards, subparts A and D, cited
in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Sec'y of Agriculture, 813 F.Supp. 882, 891
(D.D.C. 1993), vacated, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir 1994).
12. See Executive Order No. 12,291 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,866 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
13. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
14. See 62 Fed. Reg. 39,802 (1997); Documents from USDA and OMB re-
view of this issue are on file with the author. See also USDA Amends Animal
Welfare Act Regulations, Adding Swim with the Dolphin Requirements, M2
Presswire, Sept. 4, 1998, available in, 1998 WL 16521027.
15. See 62 Fed. Reg. 39,802 (1997). For example, the request for informa-
tion seeks information on the handling practices used, both by the majority of
performing animal industry and by other groups, and what practices are con-
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Regulatory and Other Administrative Changes USDA
Could Implement to Improve Conditions for
Exhibited and Other Animals under the AWA
USDA needs to interpret the AWA from the animals' per-
spective so it effectuates the Act's remedial purposes. If ex-
hibitors cannot keep animals in an environment that meets
the animals' needs, exhibitors should not have them. Unfor-
tunately, USDA's regulations for exhibited animals only re-
quire very bare minimums; while many exhibitors have
problems meeting even these bare minimum requirements,
many can meet the requirements. Under both scenarios,
however, exhibited animals still suffer.
Under USDA's current regulatory scheme for exhibited
animals, there are no specific standards for the care of any
species of exhibited animal. USDA has non-specific regula-
tions for exhibited animals; these are set forth at sub-part F
of the AWA Regulations. 16 They are entitled, "Specification
for the Humane Handling, Care, Treatment and Transporta-
tion of Warm Blooded Animals Other than Dogs, Cats, Rab-
bits, Hamsters, Guinea Pigs, Marine mammals, and
Nonhuman Primates."17 In other words, these regulations
generically cover the living conditions for species as diverse
as giraffes, zebras, elephants, prairie dogs and polar bears.
But they are very basic and very minimal. They address food,
water, and sanitation, essentially housekeeping details that
have little to do with the quality of wild animals' existence
and experiences in captivity. A major step that USDA could
take to improve conditions for exhibited animals would be to
issue species-specific regulations, including regulations for
these animals' psychological well-being, for those wild and ex-
otic animals currently displayed by exhibitors.
Unfortunately, USDA views itself as a promoter of busi-
ness. Its approach to administering the AWA is often "what
sidered abusive. Certainly, USDA is aware of the handling practices of the per-
forming industry. Based on that knowledge, it decided that regulation on these
matters was necessary.
16. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125-3.142 (1997).
17. See id.
1998]
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are the least stringent requirements that we can impose on
an exhibitor to have animals so that we can keep these exhib-
itors in business, so that they can continue to earn money
from animals?" USDA needs to change its focus. Instead,
USDA needs to say "what do we need to do to make the exhib-
itors provide better for the animals?" USDA is too deferential
to exhibitors. For example, USDA needs to make it harder
for exhibitors to become licensed initially. Right now, an ex-
hibitor can have up to three pre-licensing inspections.18 I say
let's knock that down to two.
USDA needs to protect animals from being transferred
merely because the animal has matured or become too diffi-
cult to handle. Acquisition and disposition records of trans-
fers of animals need to be available to the public so we can
see where exhibitors are getting their animals and where
they are sending them. The exotic and wild animal trade is a
huge business. 19 Many animals no longer wanted by zoos go
to canned hunts, they go to other zoos, and they go for various
other uses of their bodies.
Unfortunately, also, USDA often only acts after animals
experience harm and often such administrative action is slow
or not forthcoming at all. One notable exception to this was
USDA's action against the King Royal Circus after the death
of Heather, an eight-year-old elephant. During the summer
of 1997, Heather was being transported along with other ani-
mals in a trailer that was left in a parking lot in New Mexico.
Luckily, local police were there and opened the trailer. In-
side, the temperature was reported to be between 90'-120'
and police found that Heather had died.
As a result of public pressure, USDA got on the ball and
the prosecuted King Royal Circus in an unusually fast time
frame.20 USDA took very drastic action. They revoked King
Royal Circus' license. As Pat Derby with the Performing
18. 9 C.F.R. § 2.3(b)(1997).
19. For an expose of this trade, see Surplus Animals: A Study of Captive
Wildlife in the United States, Performing Animal Welfare Society (1997).
20. USDA has estimated that on average it takes 540 days from notice of a
violation to a hearing before an administrative law judge for violations of the
AWA.
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Animal Welfare Society can tell you, USDA had notice a long
time ago how King Royal Circus was treating their animals
but they had not acted. USDA had not acted soon enough.
They waited until an animal was dead and then they took
action.
USDA's administrative enforcement of the Act suffers
from several basic problems. USDA only keeps inspection
records for three years. It therefore often does not have a
true compliance record of the exhibitors or other entities it
regulates. If an inspector has not been with the agency for
longer than three years, his or her only knowledge of the type
of entity he or she is dealing with is limited by the three year
paper trail the agency keeps.
Another serious problem with the USDA's ability to rig-
orously enforce the Act is that it routinely enters into Stipula-
tion Agreements or Consent Decrees with entities it alleges
have violated the AWA. Under such agreements, the only ad-
mission the charged entity makes is that USDA has jurisdic-
tion over it. It neither admits nor denies liability. Therefore,
any entity that has entered such agreements with USDA can
never truly be declared to have ever violated the Act. Obvi-
ously, then the entity has no true record that an administra-
tive law judge can use to assess more severe penalties under
7 U.S.C. § 2149(b).
Furthermore, USDA only has 87 inspectors for the entire
country and there at least 10,000 entities it regulates.
USDA's response to this, with the involvement of the OMB,
has been to turn over its job of regulating to the entities it
regulates; for the animals, this is the worst response it could
make. More logical - and animal protective - responses
would be to limit the number of entities it licenses, raise the
quality of the animal environment those entities provide,
raise the license fee to exhibit animals, 21 and require that ex-
hibitors applying to become licensed meet USDA's require-
ments and pass a pre-licensing inspection in two attempts.
21. Current annual license fees for exhibitors range from $30.00 to $300.00.
See 9 C.F.R. § 2.6(c) (1997).
19981
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Litigation Surrounding USDA's Primate Regulations
I would like to talk a little bit about USDA's primate reg-
ulations. This battle has been going on for thirteen years; I
have been involved with it for ten years. In 1985, Congress
amended the Animal Welfare Act to require, inter alia, that
USDA establish standards, including minimum require-
ments, for "a physical environment adequate to promote the
psychological well-being of nonhuman primates," 7 U.S.C.
§ 2143(a)(2)(b). When, by 1988, USDA still had not even pro-
posed regulations in compliance with this mandate, we sued
the agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1), to compel agency action "unreasonably delayed."22
Our suit also named as defendants the Office of Management
and Budget and the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices because we had evidence that they were responsible in
part for the delay. At the court's first status call, USDA an-
nounced that it planned to issue proposed regulations. Those
regulations were proposed on March 15, 1989.23
The proposed regulations for nonhuman primates set
forth specific requirements and acknowledged that nonhu-
man primates were very intelligent and social beings who
needed companionship. They set forth detailed requirements
for the physical environment that had to be provided to pri-
mates. The biomedical research industry, led by the National
Association for Biomedical Research (NABR), objected stren-
uously to being told what to do and took their complaints to
OMB. Opposition to animal protective legislation and regula-
tions were not new efforts for NABR. NABR and its predeces-
sor organizations had not only opposed passage of the first
version of the AWA, but each and every amendment to the
AWA since 1966.24 NABR's complaints with USDA's proposed
regulations were that since they were the experts with regard
to primate well-being, USDA should leave the setting of stan-
22. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter, No. 88-3640 (D.D.C. 1988)
23. 49 Fed. Reg. 10822, 10913 (1989).
24. Animals and their Legal Rights, A Survey of American Laws from 1641-
1990, Animal Welfare Institute, at 69-82 (1990). In addition, NABR petitioned
USDA in 1987 to decrease the amount of space USDA regulations provided for
breeder guinea pigs. See 54 Fed. Reg. 10909 (1989).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/11
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dards up to their research facility members by allowing them
to develop their own "plans" for the psychological well-being
of primates. USDA adopted this approach and reproposed
the regulations. 25 USDA maintained this approach in the fi-
nal regulations but also provided that the plans would not
need to be sent into the agency because doing so would make
them available to the public under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.26
When the USDA came out with these regulations, we
knew that they were a sham and we sued USDA, OMB and
HHS in 1991.27 The lower court ruled that the regulatory re-
gime had not established standards. 28 Unfortunately, the
case was thrown out at the appellate level for lack of stand-
ing.29 We sued again with different plaintiffs in 1996.30 The
plaintiffs were going to zoos and seeing highly intelligent and
social animals kept in solitary confinement with no interac-
tion with other primates. We won at the district court level.31
The district court judge said: "At the outset the Court shall
state the following: this case involves animals, a subject that
should be of great importance to all humankind. It also in-
volves the failures of our system of government, another sub-
ject of great concern." 32 "Furthermore, this case illustrates
the need for congressional reform. All too often Congress en-
acts generalized legislation and thus passes to an executive
agency the responsibility to interpret and fill in gaps that
Congress itself could not or would not specifically legislate."33
Special interests groups transferred their efforts from the
Legislative Branch to the Executive Branch to effect their
goals and were successful in achieving delay or inaction.34
25. 55 Fed. Reg. 33448, 33525 (1990).
26. 9 C.F.R. § 3.81 (1997).
27. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter, No. 88-3640 (D.D.C. 1988).
28. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Sec'y of Agriculture, 813 F. Supp. 882
(D.D.C. 1993).
29. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
30. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 943 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1996).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 50.
33. See id. at 51.
34. See id. at 51.
1998]
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"Were either Executive or Legislative Branches of govern-
ment more successful in the lawful exercise of their responsi-
bilities, it would be necessary for courts to intervene." 35
But the District Court intervened and ruled that the reg-
ulations were illegal.36 The case went to the Court of Ap-
peals. Two weeks after our briefs were due, we were told that
the panel we were assigned to was switched. The two judges
that were now on our panel had previously ruled we did not
have standing in other cases. One of these judges wrote the
majority opinion and stated: "This appeal is but the latest
chapter in the ongoing saga of the Animal Legal Defense
Fund effort to enlist the courts in its campaign to influence
the USDA's administration of the Animal Welfare Act."37
The Court went on to hold that none of the plaintiffs had
standing.38 There was, however, a wonderful dissenting
opinion in that case from Judge Wald. She wrote "this case
hardly requires us to recognize the independent standing of
animals.39 Mr. Jurnove's allegations fall well within the re-
quirement of our existing precedent. But it is striking, par-
ticularly in a world in which animals can not sue on their own
behalf, how far the majority opinion goes towards making
governmental action which regulates the lives of animals and
determines the experience of people who view them in exhibi-
tions unchallengeable. Because such a result offends the
compassionate purposes of the statute and our precedents do
not require it, I respectfully dissent."40
We filed a petition for rehearing. We had asked for a re-
hearing by the panel and a rehearing by the full court of
eleven judges. Our petition for rehearing by the panel was
denied, but we were granted a rehearing by the full court.
35. See id.
36. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, 943 F. Supp. at 64.
37. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 130 F.3d 464, 466 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
38. See id. at 471.
39. Id. at 476 (Wald, dissenting).
40. See id.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol16/iss1/11
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The earlier appellate opinion was vacated and eleven judges
will rehear the case. The hearing is scheduled for mid-May. 41
41. On September 1, 1998, in a 7-4 decision, the D.C. Circuit held that one
of the plaintiffs, Marc Jurnove, had standing to contest USDA's primate regula-
tions. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir.
1998). The issue of whether USDA's regulations are illegal still has not been
decided.
1998]
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